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This  paper  analyses  the  interplay  between  shale  gas  and  the  EU  internal  gas  market. 
Drawing  on  data  presented  in  the  2012  International  Energy  Agency’s  report  on 
unconventional  gas  and  additional  scenario  analyses  performed  by  the  Joint  Research 
Centre, the paper is based on the assumption that shale gas will not fundamentally change 
the EU’s dependence on foreign gas supplies. It argues that attention should be shifted away 
from hyping shale gas to completing the internal gas market. Two main reasons are given for 
this. First, the internal gas market is needed to enable shale gas development in countries 
where  there  is  political  support  for  shale  gas  extraction.  And  second,  a  well-functioning 
internal gas market would, arguably, contribute much more to Europe’s security of supply 
than  domestic  shale  gas  exploitation.  This  has  important  implications  for  the  shale  gas 
industry. As it is hard to see how subsidies or exemptions from environmental legislation 
could be justified, shale gas development in Europe will only go ahead if it proves to be both 
economically and environmentally viable. It is thus up to the energy industry to demonstrate 
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1.  Introduction 
Since the so-called silent energy revolution in the US, shale gas has sparked considerable 
debate in many parts of the world and has often been described as a geopolitical game-
changer. 1  At  the  same  time,  shale  gas  has  sparked  fears  of  negative  environmental 
externalities such as water and air pollution and resource costs, especially in water-scarce 
regions. The climate impact of shale gas is also far from clear. 2  
This  paper  does  not  aim  to  contribute  to  the  debate  on  the  negative  environmental 
externalities of shale gas, nor does it inform the debate on the implications of shale gas for 
climate  change. Rather,  it  aims  to  assess  what shale gas  development  in  Europe and  the 
world mean for the European gas market. Two key dimensions are discussed: first, in an 
optimistic  scenario,  how  much  could  shale  gas  change  the  structure  of  European  gas 
supplies? Second, to what extent do shale gas developments depend on a well-functioning 
European energy market and, conversely, would shale gas complement or run counter to the 
EU’s efforts to complete the internal gas market? 
Having clarified how shale gas interacts with the EU’s agenda to complete the internal gas 
market,  the  paper  looks  at  the  implications  of  this  analysis  for  stakeholders.  What  key 
requirements  do  European  and  international  companies  with  a  stake  in  the  shale  gas 
business need to fulfil to do business in Europe? Here, the emphasis is not so much on what 
regulatory framework is necessary for economically and environmentally viable shale gas 
development,  which  is  discussed  elsewhere,3 but  rather  on  the  challenges  business  and 
industry would face if they intend to develop shale gas in Europe. 
This paper makes a sober assessment of the contribution that global shale gas development 
could make to securing Europe’s energy supplies and aims to outline the real challenges that 
lie ahead. It attempts to take some of the emotion out of a debate that is still characterised by 
hype about a ‘shale gas revolution’ or hysteria about shale gas leading to ‘the end of the 
world as we know it’.  
2.  The potential of shale gas 
Before  analysing  how  shale  gas  may  (or  may  not)  affect  European  gas  supplies,  it  is 
necessary to outline what role natural gas can be expected to play in Europe and the world 
in decades to come.  
                                                   
1 This paper focuses on shale gas, which has been recognized as the most ‘promising’ unconventional 
gas (the other ones being tight gas and coalbed methane). As opposed to conventional natural gas, 
unconventional gas extraction requires more sophisticated technologies such as horizontal drilling. 
2 AEA Technology, 2012a; Lechtenböhmer et al., 2011, and AEA, 2012b; Schrag, 2012. 
3 International Energy Agency, 2012, JRC, 2012, Philippe & Partners, 2011. 2 | JONAS TEUSCH 
 
2.1  The role of gas in the energy transition 
Gas is projected to play an increasingly important role in the world’s future energy mix; the 
International Energy Agency (IEA, 2011) has even wondered if we are entering a ‘golden age 
of gas.’ In fact, in all scenarios of the IEA’s 2011 World Energy Outlook the demand for gas is 
expected to rise until 2035, unlike the demand for all other fossil fuels.4 In short, gas will play 
an important role in the world’s future fuel mix beyond 2030. 
With respect to the EU, the IEA projects that the share of gas in total energy demand will lie 
between 23- 31% in 2035, compared to 25% in 2009.5 Accordingly, in the Commission’s (2011) 
Energy Roadmap 2050, gas is expected to play an important role in the EU energy mix across 
all scenarios; representing 22-25% of primary energy consumption by 2030, and between 19 
and 26% by 2050.  
In decarbonisation scenarios the EU’s gas consumption in absolute terms is set to decrease 
due to assumed energy efficiency improvements, but the general message is clear: gas will be 
needed for some time to come and will complement variable renewables. Besides the power 
sector, gas is also relevant for the petrochemicals sector, and may increasingly also play a 
role  in  transport.  (WEC,  2012).  However,  if  carbon  capture  and  sequestration  (CCS) 
technologies are not commercially viable by the 2030s, gas would need to be phased out to 
reach the EU’s ambitious goal of decreasing CO2 emissions to 80-95% of 1990 levels by 2050.  
2.2  Geographic distribution of shale gas 
While conventional natural gas resources are concentrated in similar locations to those of 
oil,6 shale gas and other unconventional gas resources (tight gas and coalbed methane) do 
not follow the usual oil boundaries (Verrastro el al., 2010). Figure 1 shows the ten largest 
unconventional gas producers in the optimistic IEA ”Golden Rules” scenario.7 Its implications 
are discussed separately for each major region. All data is from IEA (2012), unless otherwise 
stated.8 
   
                                                   
4 The  compound  annual  growth  of  gas  for  the  period  2009-2035  is  0.9-2%,  depending  on  the 
assumptions about global climate action (the higher the climate ambitions, the lower the share of gas). 
Non-OECD countries make up the largest share of demand growth in the IEA’s 2011 “New Policies 
Scenario”. 
5 In the most ambitious “450 Scenario” of the IEA 2011 outlook, the compound annual growth rate for 
gas is thus negative (-0.5), but it is clear that even then the share of gas in the energy mix would be 
significant. 
6 Approximately 70% of conventional natural gas resources are geographically concentrated in only 
three countries: Qatar, Iran and Russia (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 2010). 
7 This scenario makes a number of favourable assumptions about “the conditions [that] are put in 
place to allow for a continued global expansion of gas supply from unconventional resources. This 
allows unconventional gas output to expand not only in North America but also in other countries 
around the world with major resources.” (IEA, 2012). 
8 As these predictions depend on many highly uncertain variables (the existence of technically and 
commercially exploitable reserves, economic growth, demographic developments, etc.), they should 
be treated with caution. SHALE GAS AND THE EU INTERNAL GAS MARKET| 3 
 
Figure 1. Ten largest unconventional gas producers in the Golden Rules Case, 2035 
 
Source: IEA, 2012. 
2.2.1  Europe and Russia 
Gas  production  in  the  EU  is  expected  to  reach  165  bcm  in  2035.  As  EU  gas  demand  is 
projected to amount to 644 bcm, the EU’s import dependency would rise to 74% (2010: 63%, 
2020:  73%).  77  bcm  (i.e.  47%)  of  the  EU’s  gas  production  would  be  ‘unconventional’. 
Unconventional  gas  would  thus  not  reduce  the  EU’s  import  dependency  compared  to 
today’s  levels,  but  it  would  offset  the  decline  in  conventional  European  natural  gas 
production  foreseen  for  the  post-2020  period. 9 When  compared  with  a  projected  low 
unconventional gas scenario the difference is (merely) 11 percentage points in 2035. 
While unconventional gas resources are thought to exist in many parts of the EU, in their 
favourable Golden Rules scenario, the IEA expects only Poland to feature among the world’s 
top ten unconventional gas producers. It should be noted that the IEA study draws on the 
estimates from Rogner and Advanced Resources International (ARI) published by the US 
Energy Information Administration (EIA) in 2011. As acknowledged by the IEA itself, a more 
recent assessment by the Polish Geological Institute estimates recoverable resources to be ten 
times lower. More exploratory drilling will be needed to arrive at more reliable estimates. 
Actual EU unconventional production might thus turn out to be (even) less promising than 
suggested in the Golden Rules scenario. 
Two non-EU countries in the region also merit some discussion: Ukraine and Russia. In the 
Golden Rules scenario, Ukraine could produce 3 bcm of unconventional gas in 2020, and 
approximately 20 bcm in 2035 (3% of projected EU demand). This would not turn Ukraine 
into  an  exporter,  yet  decrease  its  import  dependency  on  Russia.  Given  Russia’s  ample 
conventional gas resources – roughly one quarter of global natural gas reserves – eventual 
unconventional resources are less important.   
2.2.2  North America 
Even  in  an  optimistic  unconventional  scenario, North  America  is  not  expected  to export 
significant amounts to other regions (and possibly Europe). It may, however, continue to free 
                                                   
9 Note that one of the JRC’s (2012) scenarios paint a somewhat more optimistic picture in which shale 
gas developments help maintain the EU’s import dependency ratio at roughly today’s level. Apart 
from that, the key results are similar to the IEA’s projections. 4 | JONAS TEUSCH 
 
liquefied natural gas (LNG) streams from other parts of the world (e.g. Qatar), that would 
otherwise be directed to the US. 
In the Golden Rules scenario, US unconventional gas production would amount to 71% of 
total US gas production in 2035 and the US would become a net natural gas exporter of 34 
bcm, corresponding to some 5% of the gas demand predicted for the EU in 2035.10 While in 
this optimistic ‘unconventional scenario’, Canada would also be expected to export some 4% 
of  projected  EU  demand,  Mexico  would  be  an  importer  (almost  equivalent  to  56%  of 
projected US exports) even with its own unconventional production.  
2.2.3  Asia 
The viability of indigenous shale gas resources may influence domestic political leaders in 
their decision whether to allow gas to figure more in their energy mix (the fuel-switching 
argument). As regards European gas imports, China and India are relevant not as potential 
exporters, but as competitors for LNG streams. 
If unconventional gas took off in China, it could cover approximately 80% of its projected 
demand with its own production, while increasing its share of gas in the energy mix from 4% 
currently to up to 13% by 2035 (IEA, 2012). Although India is estimated to have significant 
shale gas resources as well, only 20% are deemed to be accessible. The IEA (2012) therefore 
concludes that “unconventional gas resources in India are not sufficient to make more than a 
dent in […] imports”.  
In Indonesia, by contrast, shale gas and coalbed methane could contribute to strengthening 
Indonesia’s  position  as  an  exporting  country.  More  importantly,  unconventional  gas 
production  could  complement  Indonesia’s  ample  conventional  gas  production  and  may 
represent 37%of its total gas production in 2035. 
2.2.4  Australia 
In Australia unconventional production could reach some 60 bcm by 2020 and around 110 
bcm in 2035. This could free approximately 120 bcm for exports in 2035, corresponding to 
19% of the gas demand projected for the EU in 2035. Whether Europe will import some of 
this Australian gas depends on a number of factors, including LNG transport costs (see also 
section 3.1) as well as demand and supply-side developments in Asia. 
2.3  Global gas market implications 
Traditionally gas markets are characterised by their regional structure (MIT, 2010). This a 
consequence  of  the  relatively  high  transportation  and storage  costs,  compared to  oil,  for 
example,  which  has  a higher  energy  per unit  of  volume  (Rogers,  2012). In addition,  gas 
prices are often indexed to the oil price, limiting the possibility for arbitrage.11 
                                                   
10 One may not expect significant exports from the US, even if gas prices there continue to be very low, 
as the US may prefer to stick to low energy prices to keep its competitive advantage and foster its 
reindustrialisation. Unsurprisingly, the US is still undecided about large-scale LNG exports (Boersma 
& Johnson, 2012). Other observers doubt that it is possible to withhold market forces for a long time. 
One existing loophole would be re-exporting gas through Canada (JRC, 2012). 
11 Excluding the possibility of renegotiation, there are two scenarios that limit arbitrage opportunities. 
First,  if  spot  prices  are  higher  than  oil-indexed  prices,  the  annual  contract  quantity  level  (ACQ) 
represents the maximum availability of oil-indexed imports. Second, if spot prices are lower, take--or-
pay clauses represent the minimum level of oil-indexed imports. SHALE GAS AND THE EU INTERNAL GAS MARKET| 5 
 
The  fact  that  shale  gas  resources  are  more  geographically  dispersed  than  conventional 
natural gas may contribute to the transformation of regional markets. In fact, the US shale 
gas  boom  has  already  had  an  effect  on  global  gas  markets,  as  LNG  supplies  originally 
directed to the US were redirected to Europe and Asia, as the US could meet most of its gas 
demand with national resources.   
However, if shale gas was developed in many different parts of the world, this may actually 
lead to less interregional gas trade than in a ‘conventional’ scenario, because of the greater 
geographical dispersion of shale gas resources. This is confirmed by the JRC’s (2012) scenario 
analyses, which, however, also show that the global trade in natural gas will grow in any 
case (but more so in a scenario with relatively moderate shale gas production).  
This is not to say that unconventional developments will not have a positive effect on the 
establishment and functioning of international gas markets. Quite by contrast, as the IEA 
(2012) notes, with a view to potential US LNG export capacities, the mere potential of LNG 
(more so than the actual level of export) may “play […] an important role in creating a more 
competitive international market for gas supply”. There seems to be little value, however, in 
predicting  specific  trade  flows,  as  this  hinges  on  a  large  number  of  highly  uncertain 
variables, not least on LNG cost assumptions, as demonstrated by the JRC’s (2012) scenario 
analyses. 
3.  Interdependencies with the EU Internal Gas Market 
3.1  Liquefied Natural Gas 
As  Europe  is  unable  to  achieve  self-sufficiency,  even  in  the  case  of  domestic  shale  gas 
exploitation, transport infrastructure will be important to ensure energy security. As shale 
gas (and other unconventional) resources are distributed all around the world, and most 
locations cannot be connected to Europe by pipeline, LNG infrastructure will play a central 
role in determining the effect shale gas has on the European gas market. LNG re-gasification 
terminals are technologically more flexible than pipelines and thereby give less leverage to 
suppliers. Yet, at the same time, LNG liquefaction facilities are destination-flexible, meaning 
that producers can, in principle, export to any country with available LNG re-gasification 
capacity.  
While the majority of LNG is traded under long-term contracts just like pipeline gas, there 
has  been  a  shift  to more  flexible  arrangements,  partly  as  a  result  of  very  liquid  markets 
(Rogers, 2012). Besides North American projects, Rogers (2012) expects Australia, Qatar and 
Nigeria to become the most important players in global LNG supply. However, there may 
also be increasing competition for LNG among European, American and Asian consumers in 
the future (Verrastro et al., 2012).  
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Figure 2. Current and planned EU-27 LNG re-gasification capacity (as of September 2011) 
 
Source: JRC, 2012 based on “Gas Infrastructure Europe”, GIE LNG Investment Database, 2011. 
Planning and building an LNG terminal takes 4-5 years, and they are expected to run for at 
least 20 years. Currently the EU has 150 bcm of yearly LNG re-gasification capacity. This 
capacity could double by 2020, and triple if all planned projects materialise (see Figure 2). In 
2020,  EU  LNG  re-gasification  capacity  could  thus  equal  three-quarters  of  EU  imports  as 
projected in the IEA’s Golden Rules scenario for 2020 (438 bcm). It has to be noted, however, 
that, according to 2010 IEA data, global re-gasification capacity represents roughly 2.5 times 
the global liquefaction capacity (JRC, 2012). Having sufficient re-gasification capacity thus 
does not mean that Europe will be able the secure all these supplies at a reasonable price in 
practice. 
3.2  Market access 
It has been argued that one important enabler of shale gas exploitation in the US is the access 
project  developers  have  to  a  competitive  pipeline  market,  so  they  can  bring  the  gas  to 
consumers.  This  is  also  among  the  central  objectives  of  the  energy  market  liberalisation 
process  in  the  EU,  which  is, however,  not  on  track  to  meet  the  target  of  completing  the 
internal energy market by 2014. This issue is expected to be taken up in the Commission 
Communication on the Internal Energy Market (autumn 2012). Progress towards completing 
the internal gas market may thus also facilitate shale gas exploitation. 
In this regard, the JRC (2012) report notes that:  
Questions [...] remain as to whether the EU’s internal market rules can be practically 
applied in the context of possible unconventional gas development and be clear, non-
discriminatory, timely and repeatable across large operations. 
3.3  Opportunities and threats 
The EU’s gas market has already benefited and will probably continue to benefit indirectly 
from unconventional gas developments in the US and other parts of the world. While the US SHALE GAS AND THE EU INTERNAL GAS MARKET| 7 
 
may not export significant amounts of gas to the EU, it will not compete with the EU for 
LNG supplies from other parts of the world. Having other credible sources of supply should 
increase the EU’s bargaining position vis-à-vis Russia (and other suppliers). 
If  EU  member  states  started  exploiting  unconventional  gas  reserves,  this  would  affect 
internal gas market dynamics, but not be a game-changer in the sense that the EU would still 
largely  depend  on  external  gas  suppliers.  However,  as  a  well  interconnected  European 
market would probably be essential to bring domestic gas to consumers, European shale gas 
developments may help spur investment in European gas infrastructure. In addition, it may 
create additional pressure from the unconventional gas industry to ensure third party access 
to gas infrastructures in practice and increase competition in the European energy market 
where incumbents are still in a very favourable position. 
But shale gas developments will not necessarily complement the EU internal gas market. The 
shale gas hype, especially in some parts of Europe, may detract attention from the issue of 
gas market integration, which is politically less salient. In addition, the quest for indigenous 
resources may lead some governments to resort to subsidies to foster domestic shale gas 
exploitation.12  
As an EU energy autarchy based on indigenous gas production is not on the horizon, a well-
integrated internal gas market still seems to be the most likely means of ensuring a strong 
EU  bargaining position  vis-à-vis  external suppliers.  There  are  two main  reasons  for  this. 
First,  the  pooling  of  natural gas  into  a  single market  contributes  to  the  diversification  of 
energy sources. Second, an interconnected market that allows the transportation of gas to 
wherever it is needed will also lead to a diversification of transport routes, reducing the 
dependence on politically unstable transit countries. 
4.  The way forward 
It  seems  unlikely  that  subsidies  or  exemptions  from  environmental  legislation  will  be 
justified to enable shale gas exploitation in the EU, so shale gas developments will only go 
ahead if they turn out to be both economically and environmentally viable in Europe. It is up 
to enterprises to demonstrate that this is indeed possible, for example by developing “less 
environmentally hazardous drilling and fracturing fluids.” (AEA, 2012a). 
It is challenges such as these that could also represent a business opportunity for European 
enterprises  undertaking  shale  gas  development.  They  could  develop  the  technology  that 
would allow the extraction of shale gas in a way consistent with Europe’s environmental 
standards.  These  technologies  could  then  also  be  applied  elsewhere,  providing  both  an 
export opportunity for European businesses and a potential European contribution to more 
sustainable shale gas exploration in other parts of the world. 
To enhance the trust between the general public, the energy industry and the companies in 
charge of shale gas exploitation in Europe, a step-by-step approach may be needed. One idea 
would be to evaluate the environmental sustainability of shale gas by conducting a pilot 
project  in  a  transparent  and  participatory  manner.  If  such  a  project,  under  the  close 
supervision of trustworthy and disinterested expert organisations could prove that the risks 
to  European  citizens  are  manageable,  shale  gas  developers  may  be  able  to  (re)gain  the 
confidence of citizens and investors.  
                                                   
12 According to Geny (2010), shale gas will be two-to-three times more expensive in the EU than in the 
US. The IEA (2012) estimates well-head development and production at $3-7 for US shale gas and at 
$5-10 for the EU (in year-2010 dollars per MBtu). 8 | JONAS TEUSCH 
 
The most likely country to host such a project would seem to be Poland, which has been 
described as the EU’s “shale gas lab” (Wyciszkiewicz et al., 2011). However, as the success of 
such a pilot project would also depend on the idiosyncratic characteristics of the selected site 
(e.g. local geological conditions), the extent to which one may derive general conclusions 
from just one case may well be questioned. Transparency and the involvement of affected 
citizens early on should thus not be limited to pilot projects, but would need to become 
general practice. 
To conclude, this paper has argued that a fully functioning European gas market is a key 
strategic priority. Making the internal gas market work may also increase the prospects of 
shale gas development in Europe. Only if companies believe in the existence of a stable and 
sufficiently large European market will they invest in the technology that could make shale 
gas exploitation both economically and environmentally viable in Europe.  
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